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RECENT DECISIONS

ABSTRACTS

Mary Jane Plumer*
~\PPELLATE PRACTICE-ATTORNEY AND CLIENT--RIGHT OF MEMBER
BAR TO APPEAL FROM ORDER ADMITTING ANOTHER TO THE BARShields, a member of the bar of New London County, Connecticut, appealed
from a decision of the superior court of that county granting the application of
one Dodd for admission to the bar on motion without examination. Dodd
moved that the appeal be erased from the docket on the grounds that: (I)
Shields was not a party to the action; he had no interest in it, and he was not
aggrieved by the court's decision. ( 2) The action of the court in admitting
Dodd was not a final judgment. Held, motion to erase the appeal denied. The
fact that the court rule requires members of the bar to be notified of the bar
meeting at which the application is to be considered and of the court hearing ·on
the application entitles an attorney who has contested the matter at the hearing to
take an appeal upon the issues decided against him. The judgment admitting the
applicant "expresses the final action and judgment of the court. It is as final
as any judgment could be under the circumstances." 1 Application of Dodd;
(Conn. 1945) 42 A. (2d) 36.
OF

CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-RrnHT TO CouNSEL-HABEAs CoRPus-Charles
Williams petitioned the Supreme Court of Missouri for a writ of habeas corpus
on the· ground that he had been deprived of counsel contrary to the due process
cla:use of the Fourteenth Amendment. His petition stated that he had· been
charged with armed robbery; that he had requested counsel and had not waived

* Managing Editor, M1cH. L. REV.
1

Principal case at 38.
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his constitutional right to the aid of counsel, but that counsel had not been appointed; ·that being incapable of making his own defense, he had been "compelled to plead guilty," and that he had been convicted and sentenced to a term
in the state penitentiary where he was confined at the time of the action. The
Supreme Court of Missouri denied the petition without requiring the state to
present its case, and without delivering an opinion, on the ground that it stated
no cause of action. The Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari
and held, reversed. A judgment based upon a plea of guilty is not to be "lightly
impeached"; but in the case of a plea of guilty to robbery, which is a capital
offense in Missouri, by one who was "incapable of adequately making his own
defense;'~ the rule of Powell 'll. Alabama is applicable.1 There it was said that
"where the defendant is unable to employ counsel, and is incapable adequately
of making his own defense because of ignorance, feeble-mindedness, illiteracy
or the.like, it is the duty of the court whether requested or not, to assign counsel
for-him as a necessary requisite of due process of law." 2 If the allegations in the
petition in this case are true, petitioner was denied due process of law.3 Justice
Fi"ankfurter delivered a dissenting opinion concurred in by Justice Roberts which
was based on the theory that the Missouri decision, handed down ,without
opinion, since it can reasonably be justified on failure to comply- with a requirement of Missouri law, must be so justified and affirmed. T¥illiams v. Kaiser,
U.S. 1945) 65 S. Ct. 366.1
CORPORATIONS--APPLICATION OF BY-LAW RESTRICTING ALIENABILITY
OF'STOCK WHERE STOCK DrsPosED OF BY WILL-A corporation by-law provides that the exclusive procedure for transferring stock in the corporation shall
be to offer it first to the corporation, and if it is not taken within five days, to
offer it then to the stockholders, and if none of them offer to purchase it within
five-·days, the holder is then privileged to sell it. This court is asked to decide
whether this provision prevents a stockholder from disposing of his stock by will.
The· district court decided that it did not. Held, affirmed. The requirement of
the by-law "obviously means that the stockholder must make these offers before
he-voluntarily transfers his stock, not that he must make them before he dies." 1
Stern v. Stern, (C.C.A. D.C. 1945) 148 F. (2d) 870.
1

287 U.S. 45, 55 S. Ct. 55 (1932).
Id. at 71.
3 In a companion case to the principal case, decided _the same day, the petition of
_prisoner stated that he was charged with murder in the first degree, pleaded guilty
and was sentenced to death. In the proceedings "he was not represented by counsel
ar;id _the court did not make an effective appointment of counsel." The Supreme Court
of Missouri denied the petition and the Supreme Court of the United States, on certiorari, reversed. Justices Frankfurter and Roberts again dissented. Tompkins v. Miss~uri,
(U.S. 1945) 65 S. Ct. 370. Compare Hawk v. O_lson, (U.S. 1945) 66 S. Ct. u6.
"'See 43 M1cH. L. REV. 761, items 76, .77, 78 (1945}. See also Holtzoff, "The
Right of Counsel under the Sixth Amendment,". 68 N.J.L.J., 1, 3, 7, 29, 31,
3'5 (Jan_. 4, 25, 1945); and for discussion of another case involving constitutional right
to-counsel see 42 M1cH. L. REv. II 25 ( l 944).
."· : · ·· · ·
1 Principal case at 870.
2
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DAMAGES-MEANING OF "MARKET VALUE"-Plainti:ff, a retail dealer,
brought an action against defendant for conversion of six drums of denatured
alcohol. The conversion occurred at a time when, in the court's view of the evidence, there was no wholesale market, and only a little alcohol available on the
retail market. The question raised was whether plaintiff was to be held to the
O.P.A. ceiling price from wholesalers to retailers of 87 cents a gallon, or
whether he could recover on the basis of the rate of $1.40 prevailing in the only
available market. The district court awarded damages on the basis of the
O.P.A. wholesale ceiling and was reversed by the supreme court. On appeal to
the court of errors and appeals, held, judgment of the supreme court affirmed.
The applicable measure of damages in conversion is the market value of the
goods at the time the conversion occurs. Market means "that phase of commercial activity in which articles are bought and sold. • • . It is a meaningless
use of formula to say . • . that the measure of recovery was the value in the
wholesale market when there was no such market. The O.P.A. ceiling prices
were not promulgated to protect one who converts another's property from ·making the owner whole in accordance with the established rule of recovery." 1
Zemelv. Commercial Warehouses, (N.J. 1945) 40 A. (2d) 642.
EQUITY-POWER OF FEDERAL DISTRICT COURT TO MODIFY FINAL DECREE IN PATENT CASE ON BASIS OF LATER DECISION IN CIRCUIT COURT INVALIDATING PATENT--The Lehman Company brought an action against
Appleton Toy and Furniture Company in the United States District Court for
the Eastern District of Wisconsin for infringement of a patent. The court held
that the patent was valid and granted an injunction and damages for infringement. The injunction was modified in respect to damages for past infringement
and costs, in accordance with an agreement between the parties making Appleton a non-exclusive licensee and calling for the payment of royalties, and, as
modified, the injunction was made final. Subsequently, the Lehman Company
sued a second company in the United States District Court for "the Northern
District of Illinois for infringement of the same patent; the patent was held
invalid, and the decision was affirmed in this court. In a petition to the court t>Ut
of which the injunction issued, Appleton prayed that the interlocutory and final
decrees be modified to declare the patent invalid; that the in junction be dissolved;
and that petitioner be awarded judgment for the amount paid in royalties both
before and after the date on which the District Court for the Northern District
of Illinois declared the patent invalid. The district court denied the petition and
the United States Circuit Court for the Seventh Circuit held, affirmed. "As
between the parties the interlocutory and final decrees of the District Court for
the Eastern District of Wisconsin are conclusive." Having failed to appeal, Appleton's petition amounted to a bill of review "which may only be granted for
error of law apparent on the face of the record, or for new facts then existent
but since discovered which would materially affect the decree or induce a different result, or for fraud in procuring the decree." That a decree is erroneous
under the law and evidence by reason of a subsequent decision on the issue but
between different parties does not constitute a basis for a bill of review. Mpre1

Principal case at 643.
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over, so long as Appleton remained a non-exclusive licensee of Lehman, he could
not raise the question of validity of the patent. Lehman Co. of America, Inc. v.
Appleton-Toy & Furniture Co., (C.C.A. 7th, 1945) 148 F. (2d) 988.
EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS-CONSTITUTIONALITY OF STATUTE
DISPENSING WITH ADMINISTRATION-A Florida statute 1 provides that when
an estate is shown to be in one of the classes defined therein, any person who
would be eligible to be administrator or executor of that estate may petition for
an order of "No Administration Necessary." If the statutory grounds for such
an order are alleged, and the allegations are found to be true, the court is obliged
to enter the order, enumerating in its findings (I) the names of the legal heirs
entitled to receive the estate, ( 2) what property of the estate, if any, is exempt
from claims of creditors, (3) whether or not there are any lawful debts against
the estate, and ( 4) the amount of real and personal property belonging to the
estate. The entry is prima facie evidence of the findings therein for one year, at
which time it becomes conclusive. Margaret Hart obtained an order of "No
Administration Necessary" in the estate of her husband, and was named his
sole heir. Appellant bank, being indebted to the husband's estate, brought this
action, less than one year after the "No Administration Necessary" order was
entered, to determine the order's validity. Appellant contended that it was a
denial of due process of law to give the probate court jurisdiction to bind the interests of heirs and creditors who had no notice; and that if appellant were required to pay over the money claimed, it would then become liable to others who
might later claim as heirs or creditors. From an adverse ruling in the lower court
the bank appeals. Held, affirmed. The statute, properly interpreted, makes the
heir, during the year immediately following the order, "the authorized agent of
the law to collect debts and give acquittances for claims against the estate." 2
Thus interpreted, the statute is not unconstitutional. Devolution is a matter for
legislative discretion: the legislature is competent to say that property shall pass
directly to the heirs rather than through a personal representative; and creditors,
having only a chose in action, may sue the heir, as may any other heir who may
lat<:r show up. Coral Gables First National Bank v. Hart, (Fla. 1945) 20 S.
(2d) 675.'3
.
FUTURE INTERESTS-EFFECT OF GIFT WHEN ONE OF Two CoNDITIONs PRECEDENT Vom As AGAINST PUBLIC PoLICY-Testator, having first
provided in his will that his son, George, should have a share in his estate, later
1

Fla. Stat. Ann. (1941) §§ 735.01 et seq., 735.02, 735.04.
See also Coral Gables First National Bank v. Colee, (Fla. 1945) 20 S. (2d) 675.
The heir, having obtained an order of "No Administration Necessary," sued on a claim
of decedent against defendant bank which claim was the estate's only asset. The defense
was ( 1) that the estate was indebted, contrary to the statement made in the petition
for the order, for the funeral expenses of the decedent, and (2) that the order was unconstitutional. The court held, citing the principal case, that the order was constitutional; but ordered that the amount of the judgment should be the amount claimed less
the amount of the funeral expenses "which the bank may disburse to the rightful claimant.' Id. at 676.
8
See Basye, "Dispensing With Administration," supra page 3 29, especially at
379, note 195.
•
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added a codicil giving George's share in trust to another son, the income payable
to George for life or "until his present wife shall have died or been separated
from him by absolute divorce." If either event should occur during George's
life, the principal was to become immediately payable to him; if not, then the
principle was to be divided among the other children of the testator. George
died before either condition was performed and his wife and son have brought
this action to have the codicil declared void on the ground that it tended to
promote divorce and was contrary to public morals. The circuit court decided in
favor of plaintiffs and this court held, reversed. The gift was conditioned upon
two independent contingencies; one that George should survive his wife, one
that he should become divorced from her. The first was valid; the second was
void. Although where a void condition is precedent, an estate conditioned
thereon is also void; where the conditions are independent, the estate depending
upon a valid condition precedent is valid. The trust estate should be divided
among the testator's other children or their representatives. Winterland v.
Winterland, (Ill. 1945) 59 N.E. (2d) 661.
LABOR LAW-NEWSPAPER CARRIER. AS EMPLOYEE RATHER THAN INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR UNDER. OREGON UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION

AcT-One Johnston was awarded unemployment compensation as an employee
of appellant, newspaper publisher, by the Oregon State Unemployment Compensation Commission. The statute under which the award was made defined
employment as " •.. service for an employer ••• performed for remuneration or
under any contract of hire ..•." 1 The relationship between Johnston and appellant was based upon a contract under which appellant leased to Johnston a rural
paper route and list of subscribers, and Johnston agreed to purchase papers from
appellant; to pay for them monthly at the wholesale price; to deliver the papers
promptly to subscribers; to collect from subscribers for the papers; and to turn in
any advance payments to The Journal immediately. He agreed that he would
not disclose without authorization the list of subscribers to anyone, and upon cancellation of the contract, that he would turn over to appellant a complete list of
those persons to whom he had been delivering The Journal. Appellant could
cancel the lease "for good and sufficient reason" and Johnston could give it up on
thirty days notice. In addition to current collections from subscribers Johnston
received from The Journal an allowance, which varied from time to time, to
help cover the expense of using his automobile on the route. The circuit court
affirmed the commission's decision granting compensation and on appeal to the
supreme court, held, affirmed. " ... the test of coverage of the law is whether a
case falls within the statutory definitions, which are 'broader than the scope of
the employer-employee relation or that of master and servant as those terms are
known to the common law.'" 2 It has been held in Oregon that sale of a
product to the purchasing public is a "service" within the meaning of the
statute; 3 and appellant's attempt to distinguish this case on the ground that here
Ore. Comp. Laws Ann. (1940) § 126-702(£).
Principal case at 574.
3
The court cited Rahoutis v. Unemployment Compensation Commission, 171
Ore. 93, 136 P. (2d) 426 (1943); Singer Sewing Machine Company v. State Unem1
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the relationship was one of vendor:..vendee must fail, since, Johnston being
"bound by contract to sell and deliver the papers promptly to a list of subscribers
which was the property of the plaintiff and to repeat the process daily," 4 that
term does not apply to the relationship. Remuneration is not necessarily an
obligation from employer to employee, and it does not cease to be remuneration
under the statute because the one performing services assumes part of the risk
of loss. The commission's finding that Johnston received remuneration was
supported by the evidence. One judge dissented. Journal Publishing Co. v.
State Unemployment Compensation Commission, (Ore. 1945) 155 P. (2d)

570.G
LABOR LAW-RULE AGAINST SOLICITATION OF ANY KIND IN PLANT AS
UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE-Petitioner, Republic Aviation Corporation, had
adopted, before any union activity had begun in. its plant, a rule against "soliciting of any type • . . in the factory or offices." An employee who persisted
after being warned in passing out union application cards to employees during
his lunch periods, was discharged. The N.L.R.B. decided that the "promulgation and enfoi:cement of the 'no solicitation' rule violated section 8 (I) 1 of the
N.L.R.A., as it interfered with, restrained and coerced employees in their rights
under Section 7 2 and discriminated against the discharged employees under
Section 8(3)," 3 and directed that the discharged employees be reinstated with
back pay and that "the rule against solicitation insofar as it prohibits union activity and solicitation on company property during the employees own time" 4 be
rescinded. The circuit court of appeals affirmed and the Supreme Court granted
certiorari. Petitioner contends that the board based its order not upon substantive
evidence but upon its knowledge of industrial relations; they object that there
was no finding by the board that the rules of the employers interfered with and
discouraged union organization; or that the plant's physical location made solicitation elsewhere ineffective. Held, affirmed. In view of the administrative presumption that a rule prohibiting union solicitation by an employee outside of
working hours is an unfair labor practice, unless the employer can show special
circumstances, the ruling of the N.L.R.B. was correct. Republic Aviation Corp.
v. National Labor Relations Board, 324 U.S. 793, 65 S. Ct. 982 (1945).
REPLEVIN-POWER OF COURT TO RETAIN SUIT FOR OTHER PURPOSES
AFTER WRIT OF REPLEVIN QUASHED-Plaintiff sought to begin an action
designated by statute as replevin to recover certain property, then in the hands of
ployment Compensation Commission, 167 Ore. 142, 203 P. (2d) 708 (1940), II6 P.
(2d) 744 (1941).
4
Principal case at 575.
G For a similar case decided under the N.L.R.A. see 12 GEo. WASH. L. REV.
242 (1944). See also 151 A.L.R. 1331 (1944); 144 A.L.R. 740 (1943); 152 A.L.R.
520 (1944); 129 A.L.R. 525 (1940).
1
29 u.s.c. (1940) § 158 (1).
2
29 u.s.c. (1940) § 157.
8
Principal case at 984.
4
The court quoted at p. 984 from the board's opinion, 51 N.L.R.B. II86 at II89
(1944).
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defendant, to which plaintiff claimed to be entitled under the terms of a chattel
mortgage. He filed a petition setting forth the facts on which his claim was
based, served a summons issued thereon upon defendant, and procured a paper
purporting to be a writ of replevin under which the property in dispute was
seized. Thereafter the writ was quashed for want of the clerk's signature and
an alias writ subsequently procured was also quashed, although the possession of
the property was retained by plaintiff. Plaintiff then amended his petition, alleging that possession had been taken under the chattel mortgage and asking
damages and a declaratory judgment. The court first, granted plaintiff the relief
requested and then, upon application of defendant, granted a new trial and
dismissed the action, on the ground that the court was without jurisdiction in a
replevin action so long as no writ of replevin had been issued. On appeal, held,
reversed and judgment for plaintiff reinstated. The statute provides for an action
called replevin to take the place of the common law actions of replevin and
detinue.1 The court acquired jurisdiction of the action by the filing of the petition and the issuance of the summons, and the jurisdiction was retained notwithstanding the fact that the writ of replevin was quashed. Deschttnes v. Beall,
(Wyo. 1945) 154 P. (2d) 524.

T AXATION-!NCREASE

IN VALUE OF OPTION AS PRESENT INCOME-

Respondent received from his employer as compensation for services rendered,
an option to purchase stock in another corporation at a price not less than its
then market value. Later, when the market value went up, respondent exercised his option. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue determined that the
difference between the option and the market value was "compensation" under
the applicable provision of the Revenue Acts and regulations,1 and taxable as income in the years in which the stock was purchased. Upon petition to review
the commissioner's findings the Tax Court sustained him. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed 2 on the ground that the stock was not compensation for services but that exercise of the option was a "mere purchase of a
capital investment which could result in taxable income only upon sale of the
stock." 3 The Supreme Court granted certiorari on a petition which asserted a
conflict with the decision in Connolly's Estate v. Commissioner. 4 Held, circuit
court of appeals reversed, decision of the Tax Court affirmed. When the option
price is less than the market value the option h:15 present value and might be
1

Wyo. Laws, 1931, art. 40.
Revenue Act of 1932, § 22(a) defines "gross income" as including "gains,
profits, and income derived from salaries, wages, or compensation for personal service
... of whatever kind and in whatever form paid.•.."
Treas. Reg. 101, art. 22(a)-1 provides: "If property is transferred ... by an
employer to an employee, for an amount substantially less than its fair value, regardless
of whether the transfer is in the guise of a sale or exchange, ••. such employer shall include in gross income the difference between the amount paid for the property and the
amount of its fair market value to the extent that such difference is in the nature of (I)
compensation for services rendered. . .."
2
(C.C.A. 9th, 1944) 142 F (2d) 818.
3
Principal case at 592.
4
(C.C.A. 6th, 1943) 135 F. (2d) 64.
1
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found to be compensation for services rendered; but here it had no value when
given, and it did not operate to transfer any shares of stock. Under these circumstances it could operate as compensation only as a means of securing a transfer at a price less than market value ,cor, possibly, which we do not decide, as the
option might be sold when that disparity of value exists." 5 The majority of the
Court thought it was plain that ,cthe compensation for respondent's services,
which the parties contemplated, ••. was not confined to the mere delivery to
respondent of an option of present value, but included the compensation obtainable by the exercise of the option given for that purpose." 6 Justice Roberts
thought that the judgment should have been affirmed for the reasons stated by
the circuit court of appeals. Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Smith,
(U.S. 1945) 65 S. Ct. 591.7
TAXATION-MARRIAGE OR WAIVER OF INCOME CONTINGENT UPON REMAINING SINGLE AS CONSIDERATION UNDER GIFT TAX LAW-Taxpayer, one
month before his marriage to one Mrs. More, transferred to her a block of stock
for the reason that Mrs. More, under the terms of a trust set up by her first
husband was to receive an income so long as she remained unmarried, and she
was unwilling, otherwise, to give up her income to marry the taxpayer. The
Commissioner of Internal Revenue ruled that this transfer of stock was subject
to the Federal Gift Tax 1 and assessed a deficiency. The Tax Court upheld the
commissioner's assessment, saying that marriage, though sufficient consideration
to support a contract, did not satisfy the requirement of section 503 in that it was
not "a consideration reducible to money value," 2 and that the loss of income
was not consideration because it did not move to the taxpayer. The circuit court
of appeals reversed the Tax Court, having found in the marriage agreement an
"arm's length bargain and an absence of 'donative intent' which it deemed essential. .•." 3 On certiorari, held, reversed. The ,cdonative intent" test of the
common law has been replaced by the test of "adequate and full consideration in
money or money's worth." Under the terms of Treasury Regulation 79 a business transaction is excluded from the gift tax but the Tax Court has found that
this was not a business transaction. On the question of whether the consideration must benefit the donor to be consideration under section 503, the ruling of
the Tax Court was correct. Justice Roberts dissented. Commissioner of Internal
Revenue v. Wemyss, 324 U.S. 303, 65 S. Ct. 652 (1945). 4
5

Principal case at 592.
Ibid.
7
Petition for rehearing denied, 65 S. Ct. 891 (1945).
1
Revenue Act of 1932, §§ 501, 503, 47 Stat. L. 169 (1932), 26 U.S.C. (1940)
§§ 1000, 1002.
.
2
2 T. C. 876 (1943). Section 503 reads: "When property is transferred for less
than an adequate and full consideration in money or money's worth, then the amount
by which the value of the property exceeded the value of the consideration shall ..• be
deemed a gift, and shall be included in computing the amount of gifts made during the
caJendar year."
3
144 F. (2d) 79 at 82 (1944), quoted by the Court at p. 305.
4
Principal case discussed in Cahn, "Contract or Gift?" 80 T. & E. 489 (1945);
13 UNIV. KAN. CITY L. REv. 107 (1945). C.C.A. decision noted in 58 HARV. L.
REv. 282 (1944). See also 156 A.L.R. 1025 (1945).
6
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TAXATION-WAIVER OF DowER AS CONSIDERATION IN Gm TAX CASES
-Pursuant to a prenuptial agreement made with his wife, the taxpayer transferred to a trust in her favor $300,000 in consideration of her promise made
before their marriage to release her marital rights. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue assessed a gift tax on this transfer and this action was brought in
a federal district court for a refund, on the ground that release of marital rights
is "adequate and full consideration" under section 503 of the Internal Revenue
Act of 1932.1 The district court gave judgment for petitioner and the circuit
court of appeals reversed. On appeal, held, affirmed. Since the term "adequate
and full consideration" as used in the estate tax was intended by Congress to exclude relinquishment of dower and other marital rights, the words "adequate
and full considtration" in the gift tax are entitled to the same interpretation, even
though in the case of the inheritance tax Congress specifically provided that
relinquishment of dower did not constitute "consideration in money or money's
worth." Justice Reed delivered a dissenting opinion concurred in by Chief Justice Stone and Justice Douglas. Justice Roberts also dissented. Merrill v. Fahs,
324 U.S. 308, 65 S. Ct. 655 (1945). 2
TORTS-LIABILITY OF EMPLOYEE OF MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT FOR INJURIES NEGLIGENTLY CAUSED WHEN EMPLOYER Is NoT LIABLE-Plaintiff,
the owner of a retail store located near a state highway, brought an action against
two employees of the North Carolina State Highway Department for damages
for injury to plaintiff's store and stock of goods caused by defendants' negligence
in failing to take any precautions to keep out of plaintiff's store dust and dirt
swept up by defendants with a sweeper and blower while they were cleaning the
highway in preparation for resurfacing it. When plaintiff's evidence was in, the
defendants demurred on the theory that there was no evidence that they had
acted wilfully or wantonly. The lower court sustained the demurrer, and the
supreme court, upon appeal, held, reversed. There is a rule that "an officer
charged with the performance of a g~vernmental duty involving discretion cannot be held for mere negligence with respect thereto, but on the contrary, is not
liable unless his act or his failure to act, is corrupt or malicious"; 1 otherwise it
would be difficult to induce persons to accept public offices carrying discretionary
duties. But this immunity has not been extended to a mere employee because the
reason for it is absent. "The mere fact that a person charged with negligence
is an employee of others to whom immunity from liability is extended on grounds
of public policy does not thereby excuse him from liability for negligence in the
manner in which his duties are performed, or for performing a lawful act in an
unlawful manner." 2 Three judges dissented: one on the ground that if the
character of the duty is ministerial, individual liability does not attach where the
duties are of a public nature. This was a case of that kind. Two judges dis1

47 Stat. L. 169 (1932), 26 U.S.C. (1940) § 1002.
The principal case is discussed in Cahn, "Contract or Gift?" 80 T. & E. 489
(1945).
1
Principal case at 597.
2
Ibid.
2
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sented on the ground that there was not enough evidence of negligence to go to
the jury. Miller v. Jones, (N.C. 1945) 32 S.E. (2d) 594.8
TRUSTS-ORAL AGREEMENT OF BENEFICIARY OF w AR RISK POLICY TO
CARRY OUT DIRECTIONS OF INSURED WITH REGARD TO PROCEEDS AS CONTRACT TO ESTABLISH TRUST-Jose Bayonet, now deceased, designated as beneficiary of his war risk insurance policy one of his sisters, who is the defendant
here. This action W!l5 brought by his other sisters for a share of the insurance
money collected by defendant on the theory that an oral declaration of trust had
been made by the insured and accepted by the defendant. There was evidence
to the effect that some time before the policy was written the insured had asked
defendant if she would do as he wanted with the money and she had said, "Why,
sure; why not?" The lower court found that a declaration of trust was made
and accepted by defendant and ruled accordingly. Held, reversed. The evidence established, at most, a contract to create a trust, which was of no effect
because section 3 I of the Personal Property Law 1 forbids an oral contract to
establish a trust; and because subdivision I of that section forbids an oral contract that "is not to be completed before the end of a lifetime." One justice voted
for affirmance on the ground that plaintiffs were seeking to enforce against the
trustee a trust which was established when Jose Bayonet "placed the insurance
in the name of the defendant pursuant to the arrangement previously made that
it was for the benefit of all the members of the family." 2 Blanco v. Velez,
54 N.Y.S. (2d) 217,269 App. Div. 113 (1945). 2
3

Principal case noted in 23 N.C.L. REV. 270 (1945).
N.Y. Personal Property Law (McKinney 1938) § 31 (1).
2
Principal case at 221.
8 See 102 A.L.R. 588 (1936) on promise of beneficiary of life insurance to hold
in trust for another as giving rise to a trust; on grantee's oral promise to grantor as giving
rise to a trust, see 129 A.L.R. 696 (1940); So A.L.R. 196 (1932); 45 A.L.R. 851
(1926); 35 A.L.R. 281 (1925).
1

